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NOTES
REEXAMINING SCHOOL LIABILITY
AND THE VIABILITY OF A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP CLAIM IN THE




You would think it obvious that sexual molestation, when
visited upon one of our schoolchildren .. . would undoubtedly
violate [the student's] constitutional right to be free from
intrusions into bodily integrity.'
INTRODUCTION
A high school athletic coach sexually harassed, abused, and
raped a fourteen-year-old freshman girl, Jane Doe.2 The same
coach had previously been accused of abusing nine different girls
at a different school.3 An investigation found four of the nine
allegations of sexual abuse to be potentially "founded."'
Subsequently, the school was notified, yet following a "pre-trial
agreement," no criminal proceedings were pursued against the
coach.5 Despite knowledge of evidence that the teacher
potentially abused at least four different students, the school
I Senior Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John's
University School of Law; B.S., 2008, Stony Brook University. I would like to thank
Professor Rosemary C. Salomone for her many hours of help and guidance with this
Note and for being an invaluable mentor. Thank you, also, to my loving husband and
family; mom and dad-I wouldn't have been able to do it without your endless
support and encouragement.
I Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 15
F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994).
2 Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1996).
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board rehired the coach the succeeding year.' Following his
previous pattern, the coach sexually abused Jane on at least six
different occasions.' As a scorekeeper for the boys' baseball team,
Jane was required to travel by bus to the games with the team
and the coach.' It was during these bus trips that the coach
began to systematically harass Jane for more than one year.'
The coach began reaching into Jane's blouse and fondling her
breasts.'o Jane brought a civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") against Claiborne County,
Tennessee, the Claiborne County Board of Education, and
several school board members and school administrators in both
their individual and official capacities." Jane claimed she
suffered damages from being sexually harassed, abused, and
ultimately raped by the coach.' 2 Shockingly, the Sixth Circuit
dismissed Jane's section 1983 claim against the school officials
and the school district, because it found no "special relationship"
existed between the student and the school.' 3
A mentally-handicapped high school student sexually
assaulted another fellow mentally handicapped student, Brian
B., in the school shower.14 Both students were enrolled in the
school district's Community-Based Instruction Program, a
program designed to teach life and social skills to mentally
handicapped children." Although the school defendants
allegedly were aware that Brian's attacker had a history of
violent and sexually assaultive behavior, they never took any
action to prevent him from attacking Brian.'6  Brian's mother
filed a suit for damages under section 1983 against the school
officials and the school district, alleging a deprivation of Brian's
constitutional right to bodily integrity and security under the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Eighth Circuit, like the Sixth,





n Id. at 500.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 510.






dismissed the student's action, because it declined to find a
"special relationship," which would have imposed an affirmative
duty on the school officials.18
In each of the two foregoing cases, the Eighth and Sixth
Circuits refused to recognize the existence of a "special
relationship" between the injured student and the school. A
"special relationship" is an exception to the general rule that
state officials have no constitutional duty to protect individuals
from private harms." In DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, however, the Supreme Court
recognized an exception to that general rule when a state creates
or assumes a special relationship with an individual.2 0
This special relationship arises when a state affirmatively by
its exercise of powers "so restrains an individual's liberty"-
either through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other
similar restraint of personal liberty. 21 Although the Supreme
Court recognized a state duty in the case of prisoners, mental
patients, and foster children, the limited scope of its holding
called into question the applicability of this exception in other
settings like schools.22
Post-DeShaney circuits have addressed the issue of school
liability under a wide variety of circumstances-the claims have
involved children as young as eleven years old, children with
developmental disabilities, and children left alone without
supervision. Yet, invariably, the majority of circuits have held
that public schools simply do not have a special relationship with
its students-no matter who inflicted the particular harm, be it
the student himself, a fellow student, or even a school employee. 24
18 Id. at 734.
19 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-99
(1989).
20 Id. at 198-200.
21 Id. at 200.
22 Steven F. Huefier, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1941 (1990); see also Susanna M. Kim,
Comment, Section 1983 Liability in the Public Schools After DeShaney: The "Special
Relationship" Between School and Student, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1122 (1994);
Robert C. Slim, Comment, The Special Relationship Doctrine and a School Official's
Duty To Protect Students from Harm, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 215, 216 (1994).
22 Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 731; Kim, supra note 22, at 1125 & n.123.
24 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 857-58 (5th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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In refusing to find a special relationship, courts are essentially
saying that a school has no constitutional duty to protect its
students from harm.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit, in Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington
County School District, similarly held that no special relationship
existed in a school context.25 Covington involved a little girl who,
on numerous occasions, was released by the school into the
custody of a stranger, who sexually abused her. The parents
brought a section 1983 claim against the school.26 Although, the
Fifth Circuit initially held for the plaintiff,2 7 on rehearing en
banc, the court vacated its decision and refused to conclude that
a special relationship existed and held that the school did not
have a constitutional duty to protect its students from private
actors.2 8 In reaching its decision that no special relationship
existed, however, the Fifth Circuit, like the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits, lacked a clear objective test by which they could
determine whether a particular set of facts could fall within this
exception.
The holdings by the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits
demonstrate the uncertainty courts face in determining liability
for schools.2 9 Courts lack the clear guidance needed to effectively
determine what circumstances are sufficient to create a special
relationship. This uncertainty is mainly over how to categorize
the relationship between a school and its students. Limited by
the bounds of DeShaney, but faced with a unique set of facts not
foreseen by the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit in Covington
failed to distinguish this case from previous cases. In fact,
egregious cases, such as Covington, underscore the need courts
have for an objective, analytical framework that they can apply
to any future, unforeseen facts to assist them in determining the
existence of a special relationship in a school environment.
25 Id. at 852.
26 Id. at 853.
27 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 353-54 (5th
Cir. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
28 Doe ex rel. Magee, 675 F.3d at 852.
29 See infra Part II; see also Huefner, supra note 22, at 1942 (describing how the
Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney has left an uncertainty about "whether public




This Note focuses on whether a school deprives a student of a
constitutional due process right to bodily integrity and security-
and thus violates section 1983-when the school fails to
adequately protect the student from harm. At the center of this
discussion is the special relationship exception that DeShaney
carved out.30  Part I briefly discusses the Fourteenth
Amendment, due process, and section 1983 claims. It then
examines the facts and holding of DeShaney, which have shaped
the boundaries of school system liability.3 1 Part II discusses the
majority approach taken by circuit courts in determining the
proper duty of public schools under post-DeShaney section 1983
challenges. This Part concludes with the recent Covington
decision, which is aligned with the majority view. Finally, Part
III discusses the need for a clear and objective test. Specifically,
it proposes a three-prong factor test that courts should apply to
determine whether a special relationship arises between a school
and its students. This Part then applies this test to several cases
to show an objective and analytical framework that would
provide courts with a test that allows recovery in the most
egregious of cases, such as Covington, while denying it in lesser
instances.
I. BACKGROUND: SECTION 1983 AND DESHANEY
Section 1983 permits students to file a damage suit against
school officials and school districts, claiming that the students
have been deprived of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests. 32 This Section first briefly discusses the requirements
of section 1983, and then discusses the Supreme Court's holding
in DeShaney.
30 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
The focus of this Note will not be on the State-Created Danger theory, which
"subjects the state to liability for failing to protect a person after it takes an
affirmative step to place that person in danger, regardless of whether or not there is
a custodial or custodial-like relationship." Kim, supra note 22, at 1120 n.92.
31 Monica L. Hof, Comment, Roadblock: The Fifth Circuit Further Insulates
Public School Systems from § 1983 Liability, 43 LOY. L. REV. 649, 650 (1998).
32 Huefner, supra note 22, at 1940.
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A. The Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution states that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."" The intent of
the Due Process Clause was to prevent states from using their
coercive powers in an arbitrary or irrational manner to deny
individuals of rights secured under the Constitution.34  A
deprivation of these rights is protected by the federal civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a plaintiff with
monetary relief.35  This section was originally enacted by
Congress as section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.36 Under
section 1983, a claim "must satisfy two requirements: (1) the
conduct must be committed by a person acting under color of
state law; and (2) the conduct must deprive the individual of a
constitutional [or federal civil] right." 7  Thus, in order for
parents or students to successfully bring an action against a
school, they would need to satisfy the above two elements-
namely the school authority, acting under color of state law, must
have deprived the student victim of a constitutional or federal
civil right. In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court held
that one constitutional right is a student's right to his or her
bodily integrity under a liberty interest.39  Consequently, a
method a student could use to establish liability under section
1983 is to prove that the school created a special relationship
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31 Slim, supra note 22, at 219.
3 Lori DeMond, Note, DeShaney's Effect on Future "Poor Joshuas"-Whether a
State Should Be Liable Under the Fourteenth Amendment for Harm Inflicted by a
Private Individual, 1990 BYU L. REV. 685, 685. This statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
3 Robert L. Phillips, Peer Abuse in Public Schools: Should Schools Be Liable for
Student to Student Injuries Under Section 1983?, 1995 BYU L. REV. 237, 238.
1 DeMond, supra note 35, at 685-86.
1 See, e.g., Robert C. Cloud, Federal, State, and Local Responses to Public
School Violence, 120 W. EDUC. L. REP. 877, 885-86 (1997).
3 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
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with the particular student when it affirmatively restrained the
student's liberty.40 This method, however, is a difficult task
given the Supreme Court's holding in DeShaney.
B. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services
1. Facts
The facts in DeShaney reveal a tragic tale of constant child
abuse performed under the watchful eyes of the state. After
Randy and Melody DeShaney were granted a divorce in 1980, a
Wyoming court placed their one-year-old son, Joshua, in the
custody of his father, Randy DeShaney.4 1 Shortly thereafter,
Randy and Joshua moved to a city located in Winnebago County,
Wisconsin, where Randy entered into a second marriage that also
ended in a divorce.4 2 No more than two years later, in January of
1982, the defendant, Winnebago County Department of Social
Services ("DSS"), was first notified that Joshua might be a victim
of child abuse. 43 At the time of their divorce, Randy's second wife
had complained to the police that he had previously "'hit the boy
causing marks and [how she thought this] [was] a prime case for
child abuse.' "44 Yet, except for interviewing the father, who
denied the accusations, DSS took no action until a year later, in
January 1983, when hospital officials reported to them that
Joshua was admitted with "multiple bruises and abrasions."4 5
Upon notification, DSS instantly received an order from a
Wisconsin juvenile court that directed Joshua to be placed in
temporary custody.4 6 Three days later, the county organized a
"Child Protection Team" in order to assess Joshua's situation.
40 Laura Beresh-Taylor, Preventing Violence in Ohio's Schools, 33 AKRON L.
REV. 311, 318-19 (2000).
41 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989).
42 Id.
" Id. at 192.
" Id. (second alteration in original).
45 Id.
46 Id.
4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The team consisted of "a pediatrician,
a psychologist, a police detective, the county's lawyer, several DSS caseworkers, and
various hospital personnel." Id.
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After determining that there was a lack of evidence of child
abuse to keep Joshua in the custody of the court, Joshua's father
received custody of his son again.
Within a month, the DSS caseworker handling Joshua's case
received a phone call from emergency room personnel reporting
that Joshua had once again been treated for "suspicious
injuries."4 9 Although it was concluded that no basis for action
existed, the caseworker, during monthly visits, observed further
signs of suspicious injures."o Except for recording all these
incidents in her file, the caseworker did nothing more." The
caseworker was once again notified by the emergency room in
November of 1983 that Joshua had been treated for injuries,
believed to be caused by child abuse.52 Still DSS took no action,
even after the caseworker on the two subsequent visits was
denied access to see Joshua.53
Early in 1984, at the age of four, Joshua fell into a life-
threatening coma after his father severely beat him. Although
he did not die that day, Joshua suffered such severe brain
damage that he became profoundly retarded and was expected to
be institutionalized for the rest of his life.54 Emergency brain
surgery revealed numerous hemorrhages inflicted by traumatic
injuries to Joshua's head, caused over an extended period of
time.'5
Joshua's mother sought justice by bringing an action against
DSS on behalf of Joshua under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin." The
plaintiffs alleged deprivation of Joshua's constitutional right to
"liberty without due process of law" under the Fourteenth
Amendment because DSS should have intervened to protect
Joshua "against a risk of violence at his father's hands of which
they knew or should have known.""
48 Id.
4 Id.
50 Id. at 192-93. The caseworker noticed injuries on Joshua's head and observed
that Joshua had not been enrolled in school. The girlfriend also had not moved out
as agreed. Id.










The lower courts denied the plaintiffs' claim. 8 On summary
judgment, Judge John W. Reynolds dismissed the civil rights
action against DSS, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.s" The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
had not proven an actionable section 1983 claim for two
alternative reasons: (1) a state or local government entity is not
required under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect its "people from private violence, or other
mishaps not attributable to the conduct of its employees," 60 and
(2) under section 1983, the plaintiffs could not establish a
deprivation of constitutional rights because the causal connection
between DSS's action and Joshua's injuries was too attenuated.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a
special relationship arises between the state and the particular
child once the state has knowledge of the danger that the child
may be abused.6 2
Similarly, the Supreme Court affirmed.63 Writing for the
Court, Justice Rehnquist found that the State had no
constitutional duty to protect Joshua.6 4 Justice Rehnquist's
analysis began with an explanation of the limiting language of
the Due Process Clause.65  The failure of a state to protect an
individual against private violence was deemed not to be a
violation of the Due Process Clause.6 The Due Process Clause
was held by the Court to be "a limitation on the State's power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security."6 ' Additionally, particularly when the harm was not
"8 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 303-04
(7th Cir. 1987), affd, 498 U.S. 189 (1989).
59 Id.
6o Id. at 301.
61 Id. at 302-03.
62 Id. at 303.
1 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 498 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).
6 Id. at 201. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion on behalf of a six-
member majority. Id. at 190. Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Marshall and Blackmun joined. Id.
65 Id. at 195-96.
6 Id. at 197.
6' Id. at 195.
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exacted by a state actor, the absence of positive rights was found
by the Court to preclude liability based on a state's failure to
act.68
While not generally recognizing a state duty, the Court did
recognize an exception for special relationships. Justice
Rehnquist discussed the types of special relationships that are
sufficient to enforce a constitutional duty69 and found that the
Court does recognize an exception when it comes to state
custody. 0 Relying on its past cases,n such as Estelle v. Gamble2
and Youngberg v. Romeo, 3 Justice Rehnquist discussed two
situations where such duty under state custody arises: in the
case of (1) prisoners4 and (2) mental patients." The Court used
the Estelle-Youngberg analysis to demonstrate that the state has
a "'duty to assume some responsibility for . .. [the] safety and
general well-being' of prisoners and the involuntarily
committed."7 6 Thus, the Court found that the Constitution only
imposes a corresponding duty on the state to assume some
responsibility when "the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will."7
6 DeMond, supra note 35, at 695.
69 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99.
70 Id. at 198 ("It is true that in certain limited circumstances the Constitution
imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to
particular individuals.").
n1 Id. at 198-99 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-24 (1982);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962)).
72 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
73 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
7 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (holding that because the prisoner is unable "'by
reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself,' " it is only "just" that the
state be required to care for him (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293
(1926))).
71 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314-25 (holding that under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the state is required to provide involuntarily
committed mental patients with such services as are necessary to ensure their
"reasonable safety" from themselves and others).
7 Michael Gilbert, Comment, Keeping the Door Open: A Middle Ground on the
Question of Affirmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 471, 479
(1993) (alterations in original).




The Court, however, also left open the possibility that a
custodial relationship with the state may also exist under a third
circumstance-the foster care footnote." Specifically, in footnote
nine, Justice Rehnquist commented on how a foster care
placement by the state might be "sufficiently analogous to
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative
duty to protect."" Thus, according to Justice Rehnquist, the
state's obligation is created by the "[s]tate's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-
through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar
restraint of personal liberty." 0
Applying this analysis to the case of Joshua, the Court
concluded that the State could not be found liable as there was
no constitutional duty to protect Joshua.8 ' The Court found that
the Estelle-Youngberg analysis did not apply in Joshua's case
because Joshua had never been in state custody when the harms
inflicted on him occurred, but rather, he was in his father's
custody-who was by no means a "state actor."8 2  Contrasting
Joshua's case with a foster care situation, the Court, under the
foster care footnote, wrote that the State could have been found
7 Id. at 201 n.9 ("Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed
Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we
might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization
to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect."); see Gilbert, supra note 76, at 480 n.41
(explaining how "[tihis footnote is conventionally recognized as the foster care
footnote").
79 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
80 Id. at 200. Under the similar restraint of personal liberty, lower courts,
finding that this footnote leaves open the possibility that DeShaney does not only
limit affirmative duties to the strict custodial settings of prisoners or institution,
have held that a special relationship does exist between the state and children in
foster care placements. See Gilbert, supra note 76, at 480 ("Thus, the foster care
footnote arguably vitiates any contention that DeShaney limits affirmative duties
only to the strict 'custodial' settings of prisons or institutions."); Mary Kate Kearney,
DeShaney's Legacy in Foster Care and Public School Settings, 41 WASHBURN L.J.
275, 283 (2002) (discussing how several courts have accepted this foster care
footnote, such as Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 809 (3d Cir. 2000), Lintz v. Skipski,
25 F.3d 304, 305 (6th Cir. 1994); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d
289, 292-93 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883,
891-92 (10th Cir. 1992); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476-77
(6th Cir. 1990); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also Laura
Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process Right to
Safety, 69 N.C. L. REV., 113, 130-47 (1990) (discussing foster care abuse cases after
DeShaney).
at DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
82 Id. at 201.
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liable if it had by any "affirmative exercise of its power removed
Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home
operated by its agents."8 - Thus, although the State might have
had knowledge of the dangers that Joshua faced, the Court found
that the State had neither played any role in their creation nor
had it done anything to place him in a position any more
vulnerable to them.' The Court found that the most that could
be said about the State was that "[it] stood by and did nothing
when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for
them."" Similarly, the State was not found liable for taking
temporary custody of Joshua, because after returning him to his
father's custody, the State had never placed him in any worse
position than if it had refused to act at all.
Finally, although the Court denied the plaintiffs' federal
claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it noted that the plaintiffs may have had state law
claims." The Court disclosed how a state, through its courts and
legislatures, could impose affirmative duties of care and
protection upon its agents as it wishes."
II. THE CHALLENGES FACED BY COURTS POST-DESHANEY
This Part demonstrates the difficulties courts have faced
post-DeShaney when it comes to determining school liability
under a section 1983 suit filed by a student against the officials
and the school district, claiming a violation of the student's
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Specifically this Part
first discusses the approach taken by the majority of the circuits
after DeShaney when deciding whether the special relationship
exception applies to schools, thus creating a duty to protect their
8 Id. at 201 n.9.
" Id. at 201. Since the DeShaney decision, this language by the Supreme Court
has given rise to a State-Created Danger theory. See, e.g., Uhirig v. Harder, 64 F.3d
567, 572 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.
1993); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993); Freeman v. Ferguson,
911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348,
354 (11th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1989);
Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 3
(2007).
5 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203 (emphasis added).
* Id. at 201.
8 Id. at 201-02.
" Id. at 202.
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students from harm. Next, it discusses the majority courts'
rationales for limiting liability. Finally, this section addresses
the recent Fifth Circuit decision in Covington.
A. Post-DeShaney School Liability Cases
1. Majority Circuit View-No Special Relationship
The majority of circuit courts have denied a special
relationship between public schools and their students, namely
because they have found that schools do not place the same
restraints on students' liberty as do prisons and state mental
health institutions." The First and Tenth Circuits have refused
to find a special relationship in the school context even in cases
where children have been left alone without supervision. 0 In
Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, the parents of a fourteen-year-old
student who attempted suicide by hanging herself in the school
locker room sued the school claiming a violation of section 1983.91
The student's gym teacher had reprimanded the student for
misconduct and the student was told to return to the locker room,
where she was unsupervised.9 2 Despite allegations that the
teacher knew or should reasonably have known that the student,
a rape-victim, was distressed, the First Circuit refused to find a
special relationship between the school and the student.93 It did
not matter to the court that three months before the student's
suicide attempt, several other students had attempted suicide at
school or at school events.9 4 In Maldonado v. Josey, an eleven-
" Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 358-59 (5th
Cir. 2011) (King, J., dissenting), affd in part, rev'd in part, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir.
2012) (en banc).
Conspicuously absent from the majority's opinion is a discussion of the
decisions from other circuits. Like our court, each circuit to address the
issue has concluded that compulsory attendance laws do not create a
'special relationship' between public schools and their students because
even though school attendance is compulsory, public schools do not place
the same restraints on students' liberty as do prisons and state mental
health institutions.
Id.
" See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
91 175 F.3d 68, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1999).
92 Id.
9 Id. at 70-71.
9 Id. at 70.
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year-old boy died of accidental strangulation in an unsupervised
cloakroom adjacent to his classroom." Like the First Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit denied the existence of a special relationship."
Additionally, several courts have denied special relationship
claims in cases where students were harmed by their fellow
peers." In D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School, the Third Circuit refused to hold the school liable for
physical, verbal, and sexual assault of two female students by
several male students primarily occurring in a unisex bathroom
and a darkroom. Both locations, however, were part of a
classroom. It was alleged that a teacher was present in this
classroom during the attacks.99 Although these acts allegedly
took place during the school day, the court denied the plaintiffs'
prison analogy as students "could, and did, leave the school
building every day.""oo Thus, a school could not be found to
restrict students' liberty as it did not deny students "meaningful
access to sources of help."o'
Following the lead of its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit in
Stevenson ex rel. Stevenson v. Martin County Board of Education,
denied a ten-year-old student's claim of a special relationship
between him and the school.102 The boy was assaulted by his
classmates. 103 The court held that "[alttending school is not the
equivalent of incarceration or institutionalization," and thus
school officials are not "constitutionally liable for failing to
prevent all student-on-student violence."o'0 In Dorothy J. v. Little
Rock School District, a mentally retarded high school boy was
sexually assaulted and raped by another mentally retarded
student.10 The Eighth Circuit denied the plaintiffs special
relationship claim.106 Similarly, in Patel v. Kent School District,
the Ninth Circuit refused to find a special relationship between
95 975 F.2d 727, 728 (10th Cir. 1992).
96 Id. at 732-33.
9 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text; infra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
8 972 F.2d 1364, 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992).
99 Id. at 1366.
10 Id. at 1372.
101 Id.
102 3 F. App'x 25, 27, 31 (4th Cir. 2001).
10 Id. at 27.
104 Id. at 31.
10 7 F.3d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1993).
106 Id. at 734.
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the school and the student victim in a case involving sexual
assault by a developmentally disabled high school student on
another fellow peer. 0  Specifically, the court found that a
"tailored educational program for a disabled student" cannot
reach to the level of state custody. 0 8
Likewise, both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have refused
to find a special relationship between the school and the harmed
student even in cases where the harm was inflicted by school
employees. 09 In Doe v. Claiborne County, a fourteen-year-old
student was sexually harassed, abused, and raped by an athletic
coach off school grounds."0  Despite previous sexual abuse
allegations, the Sixth Circuit ruled in the defendants' favor.
Although the Sixth Circuit found the facts of this case were
"tragic," and it was "deeply disturbed by [the coach's] sexual
abuse of Doe," under the limits of DeShaney, the Court refused to
find a special relationship."' In J.O. v. Alton Community Unit
School District 11, a teacher sexually molested three "school-age
children."11 2 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit refused to find a
special relationship, basing its conclusion on the fact that school
children, unlike prisoners and mental patients, are able to
provide for their "basic human needs," and "parents still retain
primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, sheltering, and
caring for the child.""'
2. Main Rationales for Limiting School Liability
As the preceding cases demonstrate, most courts post-
DeShaney have refused to find a special relationship between the
harmed student and the school." 4
Numerous rationales have been given for refusing to find
such a relationship. Mainly, courts are fearful of exposing a state
actor to unlimited liability under a section 1983 claim."5 Schools
107 648 F.3d 965, 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2011).
108 Id. at 974.
' See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
no 103 F.3d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1996).
ni Id. at 510.
112 909 F.2d 267, 268 (7th Cir.1990).
113 Id. at 272.
nI See supra Part II.A. 1 for a discussion of these cases.
11 See, e.g., DeMond, supra note 35, at 690 ("Because of the threat of unlimited




are viewed as a "sanctuary of safety and nurturance"no and as
fulfilling a central role of state and local government.1 17  As
schools are seen to shape the whole form of society, great
importance is already attached to safety in schools."' Courts and
commentators have expressed concern that permitting liability in
such instances would overburden schools." 9
There are competing interests in determining liability
between the teachers-who believe they should not be exposed to
this extra burden-and parents-who wish to trust that the
school will take care of their children. 20 Advocates of the current
method fear that because schools are "already terribly
overburdened, imposing more constitutional duties and liability
for failure to fulfill impossible obligations will exacerbate an
already desperate situation."' 2 ' In analyzing a plaintiffs
constitutional claims, courts have frequently stressed that rather
than conferring affirmative rights to governmental assistance,
the Bill of Rights is a charter of negative liberties. 1 2  In fact,
Judge Posner wrote, "[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were
not concerned that government might do too little for the people
but that it might do too much to them."123 In her opinion in
Dorothy J., District Court Judge Wright wrote of her concern for
expanding constitutional duties of care and protection to
schools.124 Focusing on the consequences of expanding liability,
116 Gilbert, supra note 76, at 471.
11 Huefner, supra note 22, at 1969.
118 Id.
119 See Stephen Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney: Special
Relationships, Schools & the Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97, 138 (1993); see also
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d
729 (8th Cir. 1993); Gilbert, supra note 76, at 493 ("Clearly, courts need to draw
some lines when imposing affirmative duties on the state. Holding the state liable
for its inaction poses very serious difficulties." (internal quotation marks omitted));
John W. Walters, Note, The Constitutional Duty of Teachers To Protect Students:
Employing the "Sufficient Custody" Test, 83 KY. L.J. 229, 262 (1995).
120 Walters, supra note 119, at 253-54.
On one hand, parents expect a certain degree of protection for their
children when they are at school. Although they cannot reasonably expect
teachers to insure the safety of their children, they do expect teachers to act
responsibly to prevent dangerous situations when they have the power and
opportunity to do so.
Id. at 230.
121 Faberman, supra note 119, at 137-38.
12 Gilbert, supra note 76, at 493.
123 Id. (alteration in original).
124 794 F. Supp. 1405, 1414 (E.D. Ark. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Judge Wright wrote this might lead school officials to "be subject
to section 1983 liability anytime a child skinned his knee on the
playground or was beat-up by the school bully, so long as the
requisite 'state of mind' was shown."' Additionally, there is also
a fear of overburdening federal courts with what many believe
are state tort claims.126
B. The Recent Fifth Circuit Decision: Doe ex rel. Magee v.
Covington County School District
1. Facts
Plaintiff, Jane Doe ("Jane"), was a nine-year-old elementary
school student at Covington County Elementary School. 1 27 On at
least six different occasions, the school released Jane to a
complete stranger, Tommy Keyes ("Keyes"). 12 8  Keyes checked
Jane out of the school each time and subsequently raped,
sodomized, and molested her before returning her to the school,
where the school's employees would check Jane back on the
school grounds. 2 9
Despite its check-out policy, the school permitted Keyes, an
unauthorized person who bore no relation to Jane, to check Jane
out of the school.' The school had formally adopted and
implemented a check-out policy, which expressly contained a
"Permission to Check-Out Form" (the "Form") for each student. 131
Specifically, this Form contained only the names of individuals
allowed to check a particular student out of the school.132 There
was, however, no condition or directive in this check-out policy
that required school employees to verify that any individual
seeking to check out a student was an actually authorized adult
125 Id. Judge Wright also wrote how today with the epidemic of deadly violence
on many school campuses, "teachers would be constitutionally obliged to assume
roles similar to policemen or even prison guards in protecting students from other
students." Id.
121 Id. at 1422.
127 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 637 F. Supp. 2d 392, 395
(S.D. Miss. 2009), affd, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en bane).
128 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir.
2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
129 Id.
0 Covington, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
1' Covington, 649 F.3d at 340.
132 Id.
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listed on the Form.133  Consequently, school officials never
consulted the Form to determine whether Keyes had authority to
check out Jane or verified that Keyes was who he claimed to
be.'3  Accordingly, Keyes was able to take custody of Jane on
multiple occasions by representing himself to be different
persons-on several occasions, Keyes signed as Jane's father and,
on least one occasion, he signed as Jane's mother.3 5
Jane and her parents filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. 36 The plaintiffs
brought claims against the school district and several school
officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and under Mississippi
tort law.'13 Under the constitutional claims, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants implemented a policy that violated Jane's
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process rights.138
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the school had a special
relationship with Jane, and thus, it had a duty to protect her
because of the school's "total limitation on Jane's freedom to act
on her own behalf."'*3 The plaintiffs argued that even if the
school could not be deemed to already have a duty to protect very
young students, such as nine-year-old Jane, while on school
property during the school day, "it certainly did assume a duty to
protect her when it affirmatively delivered her from the School's
exclusive custody into the sole custody of Keyes, further
depriving her of her liberty by isolating her from the people she
trusted and the surroundings she knew."14 0  The defendants
moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim.14 1
" Id.
" Id. at 340-41.
as Id. at 341.
136 Id. at 337.
s3 Id.
13 See id. at 337-38.
13 Id. at 339.
140 Id.
141 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 637 F. Supp. 2d 392, 396





The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss.4 2 In reaching his conclusion, District Court Judge Keith
Starrett considered the applicability of the two scenarios in
which a right to governmental protection might arise: (1) the
State-Created-Danger exception 4 3  and (2) the special
relationship exception.1' Specifically, Judge Starrett concluded
that the defendants could not be found to owe any duty to protect
Jane for the following reasons: (1) The Fifth Circuit had never
recognized the State-Created-Danger exception, and even if it
did, the facts in this case did not meet the elements of this
theory; and (2) A public school could not be found to be in a
special relationship with its students purely due to the young age
of the students in the school's custody.14 5 Judge Starrett also
held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
from this suit.14 6
b. The Initial Fifth Circuit Opinion
In a two-to-one split, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit partly affirmed and partly reversed the lower
court's decision and remanded the case to the lower court.14 7 The
district court's grant of qualified immunity was affirmed by the
majority. The court noted, however, that the district court
"inadvertently" extended immunity to all the defendants, when it
only applied to defendants sued in their individual capacities. 14 8
While the court found that Jane's constitutional right had been
violated, the court found that these individuals were entitled to
qualified immunity because the constitutional right at issue was
not clearly established at the time the violation occurred.'4 9 As to
142 Id. at 405.
1' As previously stated, this Note's focus will solely be on the special
relationship exception so this State-Created-Danger exception will not be discussed.
144 Covington, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 398-99, 405.
145 Id.
1 Id. at 405.
147 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 353-354 (5th
Cir. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
146 Id. at 341 n.10, 353.
149 Id. at 353.
2013] 1089
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the district court's dismissal of Jane's action, based on that
court's refusal to find a special relationship, the Fifth Circuit
reversed.150
The Fifth Circuit held that the school had a special
relationship with Jane. 151 The court asked whether there
"[a]re ... circumstances under which a compulsory-attendance,
elementary public school has a 'special relationship' with its
nine-year-old students such that it has a constitutional 'duty to
protect' their personal security?"152 The court began its analysis
with a discussion of DeShaney.'5 3 The court found that the facts
were "significantly distinct" from DeShaney15 4-unlike DeShaney,
in which the injury to the child could be considered to be the
result of inaction,5 5 here, the school's conduct could be looked
upon as affirmative acts. 15
The court was convinced that the school's repeated,
deliberate acts of isolating Jane from her classmates and her
teachers, and then helplessly forcing her into the custody of an
adult stranger, could "constitute precisely the kind of 'affirmative
exercise of [sitate power' contemplated in DeShaney.
Explicitly, the school's expressly adopted check-out policy had
forced Jane into an "even more restrictive and unfettered custody
of Keyes, not at the end but during the school day, when the
School was otherwise obligated to care for Jane."58 Thus, by
virtue of its own policy and acts, the school could be found to
have a DeShaney "special relationship" with Jane. 5 1
c. Fifth Circuit's Rehearing En Banc
After granting a rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated
its prior decision and held that Jane did not have a DeShaney
special relationship with her school. 160 In affirming the
10 See id. at 340.
1 Id. at 350.
152 Id. at 338.
* See id. at 342-43.
' Id. at 342.
... See id. at 342-43.
16 Id. at 347-48.
157 Id. at 347.
15 Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
159 Id. at 350.
" Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir.
2012) (en banc). Although plaintiff made several different claims, this Note will only
focus on the special relationship claim.
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judgment of the district court, the court held that because no
special relationship existed, the school did not have a
constitutional duty to protect Jane from harm inflicted by a
private actor. 61 In making this determination, the court rejected
the plaintiffs argument that "compulsory school attendance laws,
combined with Jane's young age and the affirmative act of
placing Jane into Keyes's custody . .. created a special
relationship in this case. "162
As to the argument made about Jane's young age, the court
emphasized how a constitutional duty to protect a student from
harm does not depend on the maturity of the student. 163 Rather,
the court noted that since parents "remain the primary source for
the basic needs of their children," schools do not have a special
relationship with students.'" Jane was attending the school
because her parents voluntarily chose to send her there, and
thus, the court found that her parents remained responsible for
her basic needs.6
Similarly, the court rejected the plaintiffs compulsory school
attendance claim.'6 6 Although the court recognized that Jane's
attendance at school was mandated by compulsory attendance
laws, the court noted how "compulsory school attendance laws do
not alone create a special relationship."e16 The court emphasized
how Jane's parents had been free at any time to remove her from
the school if they felt that her safety was being compromised. 6
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a
special relationship formed from the school's indifferent conduct
in releasing Jane to Keyes.'s As to this claim, the court
emphasized that the school officials "did not knowingly transfer
that custody to an unauthorized individual."' This particular
fact was important to the court, as it noted that this requirement
that state actors know that they are restricting an individual's
liberty is inherent in the Supreme Court's holding that a state
161 Id. at 852, 858.
162 Id. at 858.
16 Id. at 859-60.
16 Id. at 859 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11 Id. at 861.
166 Id.
' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 861-62.
170 Id. at 862.
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official may create a special relationship through an affirmative
exercise of its power.171 "When a school employee carelessly fails
to ensure that an adult is authorized to take an elementary
student from the school, no state actor has knowledge that the
school has thereby restricted the student's liberty, because the
adult taking the student from school may or may not be
authorized."1 72
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW OBJECTIVE FRAMEWORK:
THE THREE-PRONG FACTOR TEST
Despite the DeShaney special relationship exception, the
majority of courts have refused to find that such a relationship
exists in the school context. However, the current analysis used
by courts in determining whether a special relationship exists is
impractical, opaque, and overly subjective. Courts, and more
importantly, victimized children, are in need of a clear and
objective test to determine school liability. This Part proposes a
three-prong factor test that courts should apply to determine
whether a DeShaney special relationship exists. This test creates
an objective framework that balances the competing concerns of
both schools and parents and would provide courts with much-
needed guidance in deciding such section 1983 claims. Finally,
this Part concludes by applying this test to several earlier circuit
court cases: first, to the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in
Covington,13 and second, to two earlier circuit court cases-
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District"4 and Doe ex rel. Magee
v. Claiborne County."'
A. The Schools' Need for a Clear, Objective Test To Determine
the Existence of a Special Relationship
The Circuits' divergent approaches to determining the
viability of a special relationship claim underscore the need to
formulate a clear test. Although the majority of circuits have
simply refused to find a special relationship between the harmed
student and the school, there has been no clear guidance given to
courts as to what circumstances might suffice to create a special
171 Id.
172 Id.
13 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012).
17 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
" 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996).
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relationship. Consequently, this Part sets forth a three-prong
factor test that courts should apply in determining whether a
school fits within a DeShaney special relationship exception. The
three factors are as follows: (1) potential gravity of the harm;
(2) foreseeability; and (3) age and maturity of the student. By
forcing courts to analyze all three factors, this test strikes a
balance between the competing interests of teachers-who
believe they should not be exposed to this burden-and parents-
who seek safety in schools. By applying this test, courts would
have an objective and analytical framework by which they would
be able to permit recovery in the most egregious of cases, such as
Covington, while denying it in lesser instances. Unlike state tort
law remedies, a finding of school liability under a section 1983
claim will impose a federal constitutional requirement on every
school, in every state, and thus create a safer environment for all
students. 176
This test is consistent with DeShaney. The Supreme Court,
in DeShaney, recognized that a state creates or assumes a special
relationship with an individual when it affirmatively restrains
an individual's liberty-either through imprisonment,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty."' Limited by the case at hand, the Court did not give
details as to what such "other similar restraint of personal
liberty"" might be. These three above factors would be
illustrative in determining whether the state has affirmatively
restrained a student's liberty.
Additionally, various courts have separately considered some
of these factors. 7 9 Under this test, however, a court would
balance all these factors in determining whether a school
official's act or omission has so affirmatively restrained a
student's "personal liberty" and thus "imposed on [the student's]
freedom to act on his [or her] own behalf' so as to create a special
relationship between the school and the student. 80 Such a test is
needed because alternative remedies like the State-Created
176 Alison Bethel, Note, Keeping Schools Safe: Why Schools Should Have an
Affirmative Duty To Protect Students from Harm by Other Students, 2 PIERCE L.
REV. 183, 199 (2004).
11 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
178 Id.
179 See supra Part II.
180 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
2013] 1093
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Danger theory are insufficient.'"' For instance, this test is
broader because it is not limited only to circumstances where the
school actively placed a student in harm's way. This test is also
more fact sensitive and thus allows flexibility to accommodate
different settings-both in-school and out-of-school sponsored
volunteer events-where unique and complex fact patterns
demand a special balancing of individual and governmental
interests.
Finally, this test proposes that the courts should apply a
"totality of the circumstances" approach when deciding whether a
special relationship exception applies to the case at hand. The
Supreme Court has recognized a "totality of circumstance"
approach in other areas of constitutional law.182  Consequently,
each case will be examined individually in light of the
surrounding circumstances-no one factor will be dispositive.
Thus, the mere fact that a child is young or suffered a
particularly egregious harm would not be enough to permit the
court to find the existence of a special relationship. This case-by-
case approach will allow courts to recognize that the strengths of
competing interests may vary by context.
B. Determining Whether Schools Fit Within DeShaney's Special
Relationship Exception-The Application of a Three-Prong
Factor Test
1. Potential Gravity of the Harm
Certain school policies or practices, whether formal or
informal, might impose such a grave potential gravity of harm on
a student that it thus affirmatively creates a duty upon the
school to protect the student. In evaluating this factor, courts
181 Under this State-Created Danger theory, a state actor may be liable under
section 1983 if the state actor created or knew of a dangerous situation and
affirmatively placed the plaintiff in that situation. See, e.g., Carlton v. Cleburne
Cnty., 93 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir. 1996) ("In [the State-Created Danger theory] cases
the courts have uniformly held that state actors may be liable if they affirmatively
created the plaintiffs' peril or acted to render them more vulnerable to danger. In
other words, the individuals would not have been in harm's way but for the
government's affirmative actions." (citation omitted)).
182 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266-67 (1977) (holding that before the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it first applies a "totality of circumstances" approach to prove whether
there was intent of discrimination).
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would find an affirmative duty arises when the school, through
its procedure, places students in a situation in which the
existence of a potential harm is grave.
Additionally, this factor will remove an enormous burden on
students and instead place this burden properly on the school. In
many cultures, children generally do not challenge authority.'13
Thus, in situations where schools create a potentially dangerous
and harmful situation for students, not all students will be able
to raise reasonable objections to a school official's authority.
Accordingly, schools place a tremendous burden on their students
to make any reasoned objections when they are faced with a
potentially harmful situation. Under this factor, however, this
burden will be shifted away from students who might not be able
to voice their opinions, and instead it will be placed on a party
that is partly responsible for this harm.
Furthermore, in evaluating this factor, school liability may
attach regardless of whether the harm occurred during school or
during an out-of-school activity, such as a school-sponsored camp
or recreational event occurring outside the boundaries of school.
Rather than focusing on where the harm occurred, courts should
instead look at the potential gravity of harm that the school's act
created. Hence, this test allows schools to potentially be liable
when they implement a policy or create an environment where
the probability of harm is grave.
2. Foreseeability
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's majority opinion in
Covington,'8 4 in determining whether a special relationship exists
between the school and a student, foreseeability should also be
one factor that courts consider. Under this factor, the student
victim needs to demonstrate that, in connection with a particular
school policy or practice, the school official failed to protect the
particular student from a known or reasonably foreseeable harm.
18 See, e.g., PATRICIA BILL, PACER CTR. INC., PARENTS FROM VARIED CULTURES
CAN COMMUNICATE WITH SCHOOLS 1 (2000), available at http://www.pacer.org/mpc/
pdflMPC19.pdf ("Southeast Asian parents, for example, teach their children not to
challenge authority in most instances."); KATHLEEN MALLEY-MORRISON & DENISE A.
HINES, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: DEFINING,
UNDERSTANDING, AND COMBATING ABUSE 229 (2004) (discussing how "[iun the
Hispanic cultures, children are taught not to question authority").
184 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 862-63 (5th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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Thus, the potential existence of a school duty would arise from
the school's ignorance of a known or reasonably foreseeable harm
and the strength of the student's evidence in showing this
particular harm. Subsequently, the school official would then
have a chance to respond and demonstrate that the harm done to
the student victim was not known or reasonably foreseeable.1 85
This foreseeability factor would strike the appropriate
balance between the interests of schools and students.1 86 While
students will benefit from a school's incentive to prevent
foreseeable harm, a diligent school official will be protected from
an unforeseeable or an isolated case of harm. For instance,
under this foreseeability prong, a school would not be held liable
for its failure to take adequate precautions to protect a student
from an attack by another violent student, if this harm occurred
years after the attacker's last outburst, or if these prior outbursts
had been directed at the violent student himself, rather than
others."18
3. Age and Maturity of the Student
To determine whether the school is in a special relationship
with a student, the age and maturity of a student should also be
considered. Contrary to the majority's suggestion in
Covington,1 88 this factor would not be inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court has previously discussed
its concern over children's inability to make mature choices." In
fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[m]ost children,
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound
1as Helena K. Dolan, Note, The Fourth R-Respect: Combatting Peer Sexual
Harassment in the Public Schools, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 215, 240 (1994) (proposing
that foreseeability should be a factor in considering peer sexual harassment cases).
186 Id. at 242.
18 Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 649, 655 (7th Cir.
2011) (discussing how the school district's failure to transfer an autistic student
from the general education classroom did not "'shock the conscience'" under the
State-Created Danger theory because the record had shown that "many of [the
student's] acts of violence were not against other people, but were against himself,"
and evaluation reports did not indicate that the school staff feared harm from the
student).
188 Covington, 675 F.3d at 859-61.
1" See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice.").
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judgments concerning many decisions."190 Despite being a
completely different factual scenario, in Roper v. Simmons-a
case involving a juvenile offender who committed murder at age
seventeen-the Supreme Court recognized how age and maturity
are factors that bear on the analysis of whether the Constitution
bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders.191 The Court
noted how sociological studies have shown that a "lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults."1 92 Consequently,
heavily taking into account the factors of age and maturity, the
Court ultimately struck down the death penalty on juvenile
offenders under age eighteen.' Similarly, in Miller v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court noted how precedent and individualized
sentencing decisions make clear that a "sentencer [must] have
the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of
youth.... Mouth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time
of immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness[,] and
recklessness."' The Court further noted how science and social
science have made the Court's conclusion in Roper even
stronger. 19
Further, as both courts and commentators have recognized, a
student's mental capacity and age can influence directly the level
of custody that a school holds.9  Many students are minors
whose judgments may not be fully mature and developed. 97 In
fact, society has recognized this as laws have been created that
190 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
191 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
192 Id. at 569.
19 Id. at 578.
194 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Id. at 2464 n.5.
*1 See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d
1364, 1381 (3d Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he duty of state entities to
protect those already within their charge should be broad enough to extend at least
to young children and those who, because of disability or other impairment, are not
likely to seek assistance promptly."); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690
F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (addressing this issue after observing that school
children are "too young to be considered capable of mature restraint," and thus
asserted that a public school "assumes a duty to protect [its students] from dangers
posed by anti-social activities-their own and those of other students-and to
provide them with an environment in which education is possible"); Kim, supra note
22, at 1132-34; Walters, supra note 119, at 257.
1" D.R., 972 F.2d at 1380; Kim, supra note 22, at 1132-33.
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prohibit children from voting,198 drinking, 199 smoking,200 or
serving in the armed forces. 20 1 As the Tenth Circuit noted in
Maldonado v. Josey, "younger children are incapable of providing
for their own basic needs; they depend on parents or other
caretakers to provide for them."202 Similarly, students who suffer
from disabilities or other impairments may also, "[m]uch more so
than any other children . .. completely lack the skills
to ... otherwise defend themselves from those who would do
them harm."203
Thus, in determining the possibility of a special relationship,
courts should, contrary to the majority opinion in Covington,
consider the age and competency of students-that is, their
mental, psychological, and physical abilities to recognize and
defend themselves against threats to their safety. Although
courts should consider each student's age and maturity under
this factor, it can certainly be argued that as age increases, the
vulnerability of a student decreases.20 4 In comparison to
teenagers or adults, younger children are much more dependent
on their custodians. Hence, especially when it comes to younger
students, this factor might weigh more heavily towards finding a
special relationship as younger students have limited
psychological and physical abilities to recognize and defend
themselves. In Covington, however, the majority suggested that
the distinction between very young children and older children is
"essentially arbitrary."205 The Fifth Circuit expressed how, if age
was considered a factor in the analysis, some students could
simply "age out" the constitutional protection over the course of
one academic year.206 This concern, however, as noted by Judge
Wiener in his dissenting opinion in Covington, is not legitimate,
as the distinction "between pre-pubescent and pubescent or post-
pubescent children is not just natural and intuitive--it is
198 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
'9 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 2010).
200 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1399-cc (McKinney 2013).
201 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012).
20 975 F.2d 727, 735 (10th Cir. 1992).
203 Teague ex rel. C.R.T. v. Tex. City Indep. Sch. Dist., 348 F. Supp. 2d 785, 792-
93 (S.D. Tex. 2004), vacated in part, 386 F. Supp. 2d 893 (S.D. Tex. 2005), aff'd, 185
F. App'x 355 (5th Cir. 2006).
20 Gilbert, supra note 76, at 508 n.188.
205 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 859 (5th Cir.
2012) (en banc).
20 Id. at 860.
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grounded in extensive science."207 Judge Wiener further pointed
out how Congress and state legislatures have on numerous
occasions "treated pre-pubescent and post-pubescent children
differently and have used age as a proxy for that distinction."208
C. Application of the Three-Prong Factor Test to Covington
In analyzing Covington under the three-prong factor test, the
outcome of Covington would be completely opposite from the
Fifth Circuit's holding. Applying each of the three prongs to the
facts in Covington, a court would find that Jane's liberty was so
restrained as to create a special relationship between her and the
school.
As to the first prong of this test, the school's compulsory,
express check-out policy created a grave potential for harm. This
policy also placed an enormous burden on students, such as Jane,
to challenge school authority. In this case, the existence of this
policy not only signaled to Jane's parents that they could rely on
the school that it would only entrust the custody of Jane to
specific authorized individuals, but it also rendered students,
such as Jane, unable to act on their own behalf, by placing them
exclusively in the custody of a particular individual. This grave
potential for harm thus arose from the fact that this school policy
gave exclusive custody of a student to an individual by
permitting that individual to isolate and take a student away
from the school. This act also placed a tremendous burden on
Jane to challenge and question the school that she had been
taught to trust without question.
Additionally, the fact that this check-out policy did not
include a requirement or directive to the school's employees that
they verify that the adult seeking to check out a student was who
he said he was-that. is, an adult listed on the authorization
form 209-further demonstrates how this policy created
substantial potential gravity of harm. In this case, the gravity of
harm was apparent-Jane was released to an unauthorized
individual, Tommy Keyes, during the school day on at least six
different occasions, in which Keyes brutally raped, sodomized,
and molested Jane before returning her to the school, where the
207 Id. at 879.
208 Id. at 879-80.
209 Id. at 853.
2013] 1099
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
school's employees checked her back in on school grounds.210
Thus, by creating a policy which left open the possibility for
grave harm, the school in Covington voluntary assumed a duty to
protect students such as Jane.
Second, the school in Covington could have reasonably
foreseen the harm suffered by Jane. Not only had the school
received complaints and inquiries about its express check-out
policy, but it had also had internal safety meetings and
discussions concerning access to students under the school's care
and control by unauthorized individuals.21' Additionally, the
mere fact that the school had a "Permission to Check-out Form"
clearly indicates that the school had actual knowledge that if a
minor child was released to an unauthorized person, it would
create a danger to the child.212
Thus, it could be argued that these complaints demonstrated
the school's actual knowledge of the dangers created by the
school's policies, customs, and regulations. Specifically, the
school could be considered to have been aware that nine-year-old
Jane's safety was threatened by this policy-regardless of
whether the school was aware that Jane had already been
sexually abused when it repeatedly checked her out to Keyes.
The fact that "the potential sexual assault of pre-pubescent
children in general and nine-year-old girls in particular is hardly
an unknown threat" further demonstrates the foreseeability of
this harm.2 13 Thus, in this case, the awareness of the risk that
this school policy carried was sufficient to put the school on
notice of this kind of harm.
Finally, as to the last prong of the factor test, a court could
find that Jane's very young age and maturity also weighs more
heavily in finding a special relationship between her and the
school. Unlike middle school students, pre-pubescent,
elementary students could be considered incapable of protecting
themselves. Specifically, nine-year-old children, such as Jane,
lack the real ability to fend for themselves against threatening
210 Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 649 F.3d 335, 338, 340 (5th
Cir. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
I Id. at 350, 352.
212 Brief for Appellant, Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d
849 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 09-60406), 2009 WL 7112029, at *24.
213 Covington, 649 F.3d at 352 (describing how many schools across the country
had endorsed a nationwide program designed with the express purpose of combating
the threat posed by pedophiles to very young children like Jane).
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adults. In fact, this is one reason why young children are never
permitted in the first place to leave the school grounds by
themselves. This is in contrast to older teenage students who
can regularly come and go on their own-regardless of whether it
is during, before, or after school hours-and who most likely
would not allow themselves to be checked out from a school by a
complete stranger.
D. Application of the Three-Prong Factor Test to Two Earlier
Circuit Court Cases
1. Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District214
Applying this three-prong factor test to the facts in Dorothy
J-a case involving a mentally handicapped student who was
sexually assaulted by a fellow student with a violent history215-a
court would, similarly to the Eighth Circuit, find that no special
relationship existed because only the last prong of this test is
met.
Under the first prong of this test, the high-school's
Community-Based Instruction ("CBI") Program did not create a
grave potential harm for students. There is no indication that
this program itself placed students in a situation in which the
existence of a potential harm was grave. The school district's
CBI Program simply taught life and social skills to mentally
retarded students.2 16 As mentally disabled students, both Brian
B. and his attacker, Louis C., attended this program.2 1 7
Additionally, as the court noted, there was no claim that the
school had involuntarily placed Brian B. in the program.2 1 s In
fact, the school was neither responsible for placing Brian B. nor
Louis C. in the program.2 19 Thus, by just placing two boys in
close proximity to one another, the CBI Program cannot be
considered to have caused a grave potential for harm.
214 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
215 For a more detailed description of the facts in this case, see supra notes 14-
18 and accompanying text.
216 Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 731.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 732.
219 Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405, 1422 (E.D. Ark.
1992), affd, 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
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Likewise, as to the second factor, the school could not have
reasonably foreseen the harm suffered by Brian B. Bringing a
section 1983 claim on behalf of her son, Brian B.'s mother
claimed that the school failed to take any action to prevent the
attack on her son even after being "aware that Louis had a
history of violent and sexually assaultive behavior."2 20 Despite
the school's awareness of Louis C.'s propensity for violence, the
specific attack on Brian B. could not have been reasonably
foreseen because Louis C. was placed in the program "at least
two years before the assault."22 1 As the district court noted, the
case would be different if the assault had occurred a few weeks or
even months after the placement of Louis C. in the program.2 22
The violent encounter in this case, however, could be considered
too remote a consequence.
The facts of this case satisfy the last prong of this test.
Although Brian B. was a high school student,2 23 a court could find
that Brian B.'s mental disability potentially weighs toward
finding a special relationship between him and the school. As a
mentally retarded student, Brian B. could be considered to have
lacked the mental and physical abilities to otherwise defend
himself from the assault.
Similar to the Eighth Circuit's holding, under the three-
prong factor test, a court would find that there is no special
relationship between the harmed student and the school.
Although the last prong is satisfied, a court would probably find
that the age and maturity of the student are not alone sufficient
to elevate the duty of the school to that of a special relationship.
2. Doe v. Claiborne County
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's holding in Claiborne-where
a school athletic coach raped a fourteen-year-old freshman girl,
Jane Doe 2 24-under the three-prong factor test, a court would
find that a special relationship existed between Jane and the
school. Two of the three prongs of this test are satisfied.
220 Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 731.
221 Id. at 733.
222 Dorothy J., 794 F. Supp. at 1421.
223 Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 731.




Under the first prong of this test, a court would find that
there existed a special relationship between Jane and the school.
This relationship arose from the school board's act of rehiring the
same high school athletic coach who had previously been accused
of sexually abusing nine different girls.22 5 Under this first prong,
there is no doubt that this act by the school created a grave
potential of harm for students. Although the school board
suspended the coach after the first allegations,"2 the following
year, the school rehired him. 227 In evaluating this factor, it
should not matter that the Department of Human Services
("DHS") decided not to pursue criminal proceedings against the
coach after investigating the first allegations.228 The school board
should never have considered this an exoneration and rehired the
coach. Thus, the school's act of rehiring the coach could be
considered to have placed students in a grave potential for harm.
Likewise, under the second prong, the sexual abuse suffered
by Jane could have been considered reasonably foreseeable. The
school board was aware of the previous sexual abuse
allegations. 2 29  Additionally, the court found that four of the
charges were potentially "founded."2 30 Yet, the coach was
rehired.2 3' After this rehiring, the school continued to observe
inappropriate behavior by the coach.2 2 In fact, on one occasion,
the principal himself witnessed such inappropriate behavior
when he found the coach sitting on some gymnasium bleachers
with two female eighth-grade students after a physical education
class had ended. 23 3  The principal had begun to personally
supervise the coach because of the DHS charge and a rumor he
had heard "about [the coach's] 'possible inappropriate behavior
with a female student.' "234 On another occasion, the principal
was informed by a guidance counselor that a girl had complained
that the coach had suggested that they "'get[] naked' while
225 See 103 F.3d 495, 502-03 (6th Cir. 1996).
226 Id. at 502.
227 Id. at 503.
228 Id. at 502.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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touching her on the ribs."2 35 Thus, in light of all this observed
behavior, the school could have been considered to have had
sufficient notice of this kind of harm suffered by Jane.
Finally, a court could find that the last prong of this test is
not met. During the time of the sexual abuse, Jane was a
fourteen-year-old freshman in high school.2 36 Jane was the
coach's scorekeeper for the boys baseball team.2 37 This position
required Jane to travel by bus to the games with the team and
the coach. It was during these bus trips that the coach began to
abuse and harass Jane.2 38 During the team's first trip, Jane sat
next to the coach, "who reached inside her blouse and fondled her
breasts."2 3 ' Although, at that time, Jane did not say anything
about the incident to anyone, she avoided the coach for the rest of
the school year. 240 During the next year, the coach continued
harassing her.2 41 There is no doubt that these facts are very
tragic. Yet, unlike elementary students, a fourteen-year-old high
school student could be considered to have a much more mature
and developed judgment. Thus, a court could find that Jane was
old and mature enough to decide to not go on the bus again and
sit with the coach.
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's decision, a court would
probably find that, under this test, there existed a special
relationship between the school and Jane. A court would find
that the gravity of the harm created by the school, along with the
foreseeability of this injury, would be sufficient to create a special
relationship.
CONCLUSION
In the seminal case of DeShaney, the Supreme Court limited
the circumstances in which the state could be found to have an
affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to protect its
citizens. The Court, however, did recognize that a special
relationship might arise between an individual and a state when
the state affirmatively, by its exercise of powers, "so restrains an
2" Id. (alteration in original).
26 Id. at 500.







individual's liberty."24 2 Despite creating the special relationship
exception, the majority of courts have been unwilling to find such
a relationship exists between a school and a harmed student. In
making this determination, however, there has been no clear
guidance given to courts as to what circumstances might suffice
to create a special relationship. In fact, courts need an objective,
analytical framework that balances competing public policies to
assist them in determining the existence of a special relationship.
The factor test provides courts with this guidance. As
demonstrated, it is malleable enough to find liability in the most
egregious of cases, while precluding it in less severe instances.
Adoption of this test would continue to provide schools with the
limited liability needed to function, while not depriving parents
and victimized students of their constitutionally-provided
remedies.
242 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
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